This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained in and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the US Supreme Court decisionmaking. by adapting the Spiller and Gely model to the data set utilized by Segal. The major findings are as follows: first, by adapting the Spiller and Gely (1992) maximum likelihood model to the Segal (1997) dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to Presidential and congressional preferences. Second, data from indicate that the average probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one third. Third, we show that the results obtained in are the product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. Finally, the estimation highlights the usefulness of Krehbiel's model of legislative decision-making.
finds that individual justices act unconstrained by Congress's and the President's policy preferences and hence sincerely vote their policy preferences. His conclusion challenges the basic foundation of the strategic separation-of-powers model. In particular, it questions whether results found in Spiller and Gely (1992) , concerning the Supreme Court's decisions in the National Labor Relations Board cases, can be generalized to other domains of policy making. 5 The question that Segal as well as Spiller and Gely attempt to answer is whether the Supreme Court strategically adapts to the constraints imposed by the preferences of other relevant political actors and correspondingly adjusts its decisions. It is difficult to resolve such a debate employing contrasting data sets and empirical methodologies. Here, we move towards resolving such inconsistent results by employing the econometric model developed in Spiller and Gely (1992) to analyze the data from . In doing so, we find that justices do adjust their decisions to Presidential and congressional preferences. 
II -RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS
Both the strategic and the attitudinal approaches to judicial decision making sharply contrast with the perspective employed in traditional legal studies. Whereas traditional legal scholarship looks to formulaic legal interpretations to predict Court outcomes, both the attitudinal and the strategic approaches emphasize the role of the justices' ideological preferences. Both approaches argue that, similar to microeconomic theory that assumes that individuals have stable but differing preferences, justices have an assortment of stable but contrasting ideologies. When on the Court, they vote on cases with the aim of enacting policies that best reflect their ideological preferences. In essence, justices' preferences can be characterized by a well-behaved ideological utility function that obtains a maximum at a particular policy outcome and decreases monotonically as outcomes move away from that maximum (the individual's ideal policy). Rational choice theories on judicial decisionmaking are divided into two leading camps, the attitudinal approach and the strategic approach. The attitudinal approach posits that justices vote strictly according to their individual ideologies. No strategic or institutional considerations enter into justices' calculus.
Decisions are unfiltered reflections of the Court's ideology, and accordingly, justices' ideologies should be the only significant predictors of Supreme Court rulings (Segal and Cover 1989 , Segal and Spaeth 1993 ).
The strategic approach shares the premises that individual justices have stable policy preferences along an ideological spectrum and that justices cast votes with the aim of enacting policy as close as possible to their ideal policy preferences. This approach, however, departs from the attitudinal approach in that it views justices as far-sighted individuals who are wary of their counterpart players in American policy making. Justices are assumed to hold a sophisticated understanding of both the legislative process and congressional policy preferences. Consequently, justices would not want to pass down a decision that would be overturned by an act of Congress if Congress would replace the decision with a policy that, in the view of a majority of the Court, leads to an inferior outcome. Accordingly, the Court makes decisions that, in general, Congress would not overturn. 7 In other words, the strategic approach incorporates congressional (and presidential) preferences as additional variables.
Supreme Court justices anticipate congressional preferences and adjust their decisions to them, and so the Court's decisions are made strategically rather than sincerely.
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It is easy to imagine situations where the attitudinal and the strategic models would generate different predictions. Consider a scenario in which the Supreme Court can make decisions that implement policies located at any point along a continuous one-dimensional ideological spectrum, as is presented in Figure 1 . 9 The figure contains the ideal points of three justices, A, B, and C, and those of the House (H), and the Senate (S). 10 A majority of Justices -who, according to the median voter theorem, are collectively represented by the median justice -would ideally prefer the ideal point for justice B. Thus, the attitudinal model would predict that the policy outcome would be at justice B's ideal point. Forward-looking justices, however, would realize that the House and Senate would act together to replace such a policy outcome since there are several points along the policy spectrum that both H and S would prefer over the policy B. Justice B, supported by a majority of the justices, would thus prefer to pass down a decision that the House and Senate will not overturn but that is as close as possible to her ideal point. 11 In this figure, such a point is the Senate's ideal point. Since the Senate prefers S to all other outcomes, it will block any alternative policy proposal, so the Court's ruling is secure. In sum, the Court chooses to implement policy S since it maximizes the utility of the Court's majority (represented by the ideal point of its median justice) subject to the constraints imposed by congressional preferences.
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The strategic model's prediction for the Court's decision, then, falls weakly within the 
III -TESTING THE STRATEGIC VS. THE ATTITUDINAL APPROACHES
In this section, we develop the econometric model to estimate the determinants of Supreme Court decisions in statutory cases. We base this technique on the model devised in Spiller and Gely (1992) , and we adapt it to analyze the data in .
The model begins with establishing a one-dimensional policy space, assigning all possible policy outcomes a value between 0-100, 0 representing the most conservative possible outcome and 100 the most liberal. The dependent variable is the Supreme Court's percent of pro-liberal decisions in statutory cases for a given year, and the explanatory variables are Congress's ideologies, guided and filtered by the legislative process, and the Court's ideology.
Preferred Judicial Decisions
It is reasonable to assume that there is positive correlation between an individual's ideology measure, whether a member of Congress or a Supreme Court justice, and her 6 tendency to cast pro-liberal votes. We implement this ideology measure as a preference for a certain percent of pro-liberal judicial decisions for a given year. 15 What is not reasonable, however, is to assume that a given measure of political preferences, like the ADA, maps exactly into the preferred probability of a pro-liberal judicial decision for a given year. Were that the case, a legislator with an ADA score of, say, 60, would optimally prefer a 60%
probability for a pro-liberal outcome. 16 This assumption, although testable, is too extreme.
We therefore characterize the preferences of an individual, in either body, for pro-liberal judicial decisions with the equation:
where * ka E represents individual a's most desired percent of pro-liberal decisions by the Court during time period k, P ka reflects that individual's ideology (with rising values for increasingly liberal ideologies) during that period, and q and b are parameters to be estimated. Since the working assumption is that the more liberal an individual's ideology, the higher the percent of pro-liberal Court decisions that individual prefers, we should observe that b > 0. Thus, our model bases an individual's preferences for pro-liberal judicial decisions, which are unobservable, on their observable generic ideologies. Note that the parameters q and b are "structural" parameters. They simply reflect basic preferences. Since in equation (1) we assume linearity, then for any b we can construct the whole game in the "probability" rather than the "political" space. The linear transformation allows us to treat representations of the "probability" or "political" spaces in the same dimension.
Let the actual percent of pro-liberal decisions during period k be represented by E k , and let individual a be the decisive member of the House, Senate, or Supreme Court who, depending on the pertinent regime, determines the Court's outcome during that period.
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Then the relationship between the Court's judicial outcomes during a given period and the relevant individual's preferences is represented by
where the subscript a reflects the relevant political player in period k and e k is an independently distributed error with mean zero.
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Substituting equation (1) into (2), we obtain:
where P ka represents the (observable) political ideology of the relevant player during the given period. In order to accommodate the data in Segal, which bundles Supreme Court decisions into yearly observations, we convert the periods in equation (3) to individual years to obtain:
where the subscript t identifies the year. While the compositions of the Court and Congress usually vary year by year, they are basically stable within a given year. Accordingly, the value of P ta should be stable throughout the year.
18

Regime Selection
We now turn to the regime selection problem. Consequently, the ADA and the averages of constitutional judicial votes are not easily comparable. In principle, one could imagine a transformation that brings one score into the dimension of the other (after all, both are liberal-conservative scores), but the selection of such a transformation is not an arbitrary decision. There is no reason why the final constitutional scores should span the entire ADA ideological spectrum from 0 to 100 instead of occupying a small slice from, say, 50 to 75. For example, Segal transforms his raw scores into 0-100 by undertaking a linear transformation, but in principle, any arbitrary transformation as long as it is a "one to one" is appropriate.
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Which particular transformation of justices' scores onto the ADA scale is used, though, has important econometric consequences. Recall that if a justice is to the "left" of the Pareto set, the justice is in a different regime than those who are either to the "right" of or within the Pareto set. So the transformation of constitutional scores onto the ADA scale affects both the regime in which each justice is located (which determines the value of the "constraint variable") as well as the independent variables used to measure strategic behavior.
Thus, inappropriately selecting the transformation will necessarily bias the results against a finding of strategic behavior. acknowledges these difficulties and reports having consulted with public law scholars to confirm that the constitutional scores created an accurate ideological spectrum (pg. 36). While approval from these scholars should indeed be comforting, and while there genuinely is no ex-ante method to conform the two scores to each other, the simple linear one-to-one translation invites a search for a more precise transformation.
We model the true Supreme Court preferences in the same dimension as
Congressional ADA scores as a latent variable, ( SC t ), which is related to Segal's constitutional scores by the following equation:
Here, SC represents Segal's constitutional scores, g and d are parameters to be estimated, and u is a normally independently distributed error. SC is a latent variable that represents the ideal point of the justice in the ADA dimension and, as such, can be used in defining the relevant regimes in the econometric model. 29 This equation essentially lets the data perform the transformation from judicial constitutional scores to ADA scores. So while the constitutional scores still serve as a basis to determine the ideologies of Supreme Court justices, the model overcomes the basic problem of reconciling the constitutional scores with the ADA ratings by a stochastic transformation of constitutional scores into ADA ratings.
A Switching Regression Model with Uncertain Separation Criteria
The introduction of a latent variable to represent the Court's preferences in the ADA domain implies that we cannot perfectly observe the exact location of the Court's ideal point vis-a-vis congressional preferences. As a consequence the switching-regimes model (5a-5c)
has an unknown separation criteria. Let s u be the standard deviation of u and Φ(.) be the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 30 We can then use equations (5) and (6) to characterize the probabilities of observing Regimes 1, 2 and 3 in year t, (L 1t , L 2t , and L 3t ), so as to determine the likelihood function for the model. These probabilities are given respectively by:
The likelihood function for the model is then:
, where:
with φ(.) representing the standard normal density function and s e reflecting the standard deviation of the error term e.
Our analysis applies standard maximum likelihood techniques to equation (8) Court, essentially, will be making decisions not based on ideology but rather on the merits and specifics of the case. In that sense, a non-positive b would reject not only the strategic but also the attitudinal approach since both approaches require that Justices cast votes based on their ideologies. Third, the model implies that if constitutional scores are a reasonable proxy for judicial preferences, then d should be positive. Finally, the model endogenously determines probabilities of each regime (equations 7a through 7c). Thus, if the probability of Regime 3 is close to one, then the strategic framework can be discarded in favor of the more parsimonious attitudinal model. Although, in this case, we will not be able formally to reject the strategic model, we would reject it de facto since it would lack both political (since the Court is never constrained) and empirical relevance. If, however, the probabilities of Regimes 1 or 2 are sufficiently away from zero, then we can adequately test the strategic model, and a positive estimate for b suggests that the strategic approach is superior to the attitudinal model. Indeed, the essence of the attitudinal model is that justices do not pay attention to institutional constraints, either because they are naïve or because the constraints are not binding. Positive probabilities for Regimes 1 and 2, combined with a positive estimate for b, reject both of these explanations.
Finally, Segal and Wang (2001) provide an overidentification test for the strategic model. Equations (5a) and (5b) imply that if the attitudinal model is false, then conditional on being in Regime 1 or 2, the probability of a pro-liberal decision should be independent of the Court's ideology. To confirm this, we add a term to (5a) and (5b) representing the Court's ideology, and we hypothesize that the coefficient for that ideology term is zero. On the other hand, if the strategic model is false, the coefficient of that term should be positive -and identical to the coefficient of the court in Regime 3 -while the coefficient of the political variable should be zero. This presents another test for both the attitudinal and strategic models.
Segal (1997) Revisited
We apply our regime-switching methodology to the data used in . But before we discuss our findings, it is important to briefly discuss approach.
The core of Segal's test of the strategic approach is an econometric analysis of individual justices' votes on non-constitutional cases for the period 1947-1992. His framework is based on the construction of a "constraint" variable that is supposed to measure whether a justice is constrained from voting her own preferences when casting a vote and is defined by the following equation:
where Max is the upper (most liberal) boundary of Congress's Pareto set, Min is the lower (most conservative) boundary, and SC i is justice i's constitutional score.
The claim is that the constraint variable reflects the degree to which justices are constrained by Congress's ideologies, and thus a test of the strategic model is whether the constraint variable is statistically significant in predicting justices' votes on statutory cases.
The regression model Segal uses is represented by equation (10):
where PL is the probability of casting a pro-liberal vote on a statutory case, a and p are parameters to be estimated, and e is an error term. Segal argues that if the strategic model holds, the parameter p should be positive and statistically significant.
Although intuitive, this approach has methodological flaws that bias the results towards a finding of statistical insignificance of the p coefficient. First, the construction of the "constraint set" is inappropriate as even though the position of the justice in relation to the Pareto set may be constant, changes in the justice's preferences influence the constraint variable, thus biasing the coefficient of p towards zero. 32 Second, the unit of analysis is the individual judge when the strategic theory only has predictions for the median judge, thus again biasing the coefficient of p towards zero. 33 Third, the "constraint" variable is built comparing directly ADA ratings to judicial preferences, which as we discussed before, introduces a serious measurement error, potentially biasing p towards zero.
Finally, and most problematic, analysis only captures the "extreme" justices, who are unlikely to be the median justice and thus will vote their sincere preferences even according to the strategic theory. Second, the method may be assigning observations to the wrong regimes and hence uses improperly measured right hand side variables. 36 Both of these problems -which are present for each of the three legislative models -bias the estimate coefficient of p towards zero.
A particularly compelling alternative to the legislative models discussed above has been offered by Krehbiel (1998) , have more reasonable ranges than the three other legislative models discussed here, and as a consequence becomes a reasonable model on which to test the attitudinal vs. the strategic hypotheses. We add Krehbiel's framework to those selected by Segal in testing the attitudinal and strategic approaches.
IV -DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our model requires measurements reflecting congressional preferences, Supreme
Court preferences, and Supreme Court decisions. For congressional preferences we use the pro-liberal scores computed every year by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).
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For each legislative model, we then determine the bounds for the congressional Pareto set.
For The strategic approach, however, requires switching regressions, and in particular, switching regressions with uncertain separation criteria. Thus, we move now to discuss the results of the regime-switching econometric methodology described in section III. Table 2 contains the results for the maximum likelihood estimation applied to each of the four legislative models.
42,43 Table 2 shows that both ideology and politics matter, as the parameters d and b are highly significant. 44 In particular, for a 10-point increase in the relevant player's ideological score (ADA for a member of Congress and imputed ADA score for the median justice), the pro-liberal percent of annual decisions increases about 3% for the Multiple Veto model and 6% for the other models. 45 From this, we conclude that the ideologies of the relevant players across regimes is significant, not just the Court's ideology. In other words, when in Regime 1 or 2, the Court does seem to adhere to the relevant political constraints. 46 Moreover, these models all fit the data better than the respective OLS estimates presented in Table 1 . Indeed, the Akaike Information Criteria show lower values for the switching regression models in Table 2 than the OLS models of 47 These results are significant because the F-V and CGK models, with fewer observations violating the [0,100] range, put a much more rigorous test to the hypothesis for strategic behavior. Given that the estimated b parameters are still so highly significant (and, in fact, statistically different than the one estimated under the MV model and slightly higher than for the PC version), the conclusion that the Court thinks strategically cannot be rejected.
In Figure 3 we plot the Max (F-V) and Min (F-V) boundaries of Congress's Pareto set with the Court's predicted ideal point (similar information for the other three models is presented in Figures A1-A3 in Appendix I). 48 Figure 3 shows that the Court's predicted SC , as imputed from the F-V estimation, generally rises and falls with congressional preferences, which explains why the average probability for Regime 3 is about two-thirds. Note, however, that there are also periods when the Court's ideology pressed against Congress's constraints.
Specifically, the Court was close to the conservative boundary of the congressional Pareto set through most of the 1950s, creating a significant probability that it was in Regime 2 during that period. The Court then became more liberal in relation to Congress in the late 1960s, thus generating a significant probability that it was in Regime 1. Then for the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Court again approached the conservative boundary of the congressional Pareto set and again produced a growing likelihood that it was in Regime 1. Thus, while the Court appears to be mostly unconstrained throughout the 1947-1992 period, it seems to have gone through periods where it was likely to have been under Congress's political constraints. 
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In sum, results from Table 1 illustrate that ideology matters, as the justices' ideology substantially influence their final decisions. Table 2 's results show that politics matter, as the political constraints also contribute substantially to predicting the Court's outcomes. Table 2 provides support to the idea that justices exercise ideology in a sophisticated and strategic manner. Furthermore, Congress seems to impose palpable political constraints on the Court, and the constraints derived from Krehbiel's model and, to a lesser degree, the CGK model seem to capture the political game more than the other two discussed. Table 3 provides the results of estimating the model with the overidentification parameters suggested by Segal and Wang (2001) . Table 3 shows that for the FV model the overidentification restrictions cannot be rejected at standard significance levels. 52 Indeed, the parameter c 1/2 , which reflects the impact of the Court ideology in Regimes 1 and 2, is statistically insignificant while b 1/2 , which reflects the role of politics in Regimes 1 and 2, is not statistically different from b 3 , the parameter for ideology in Regime 3. Thus, for the F-V model, Table 3 fails to reject the overidentification restrictions. These, restrictions, however, can be rejected at the 1% level for the other three models. Under closer examination, however, Table 3 provides further evidence of the misspecification of the CGK, MV and PC models. First, the coefficients of politics in Regimes 1 and 2 are all negative, large and significantly different from zero. The attitudinal model would predict them to be zero, while the strategic approach would predict them to be positive. Second, the estimated ideology parameters for Regimes 1 and 2 are all positive, highly significant and much larger than the ideology parameter for Regime 3, yet the attitudinal model predicts that the ideology parameters for each Regime should be the same and the strategic approach predicts them to be statistically insignificant. Finally, as expected given their large Pareto sets, the three regimes provide small estimates of probabilities for Regimes 1 and 2.
In sum, Table 3 should be zero, which it is not, and the coefficients b 1/2 and b 3 should be equal, which they are not). On the other hand, the F-V model fails to reject the overidentification restriction, and the resulting parameters under this model are all as expected. We find these results to lend strong support both to the superiority of the strategic model over the attitudinal model and to the superiority of the F-V legislative model over the models used in .
VI -CONCLUSIONS
While the journey to develop accurate predictions for Supreme Court decisions does not end here, this paper supports a sophisticated understanding of the Court's decision making, one where justices anticipate possible congressional action and adjust their actions accordingly.
attitudinal and the strategic approaches. First, we show that justices' ideologies do matter.
Second, we also show that often, but not always, the court is constrained by Congress.
Furthermore, the extent the Court is constrained by politics varies significantly over time, and when it is constrained, the Court seems to respond strategically. Given the numerous important policy debates that engage our branches of government, applying this approach to other political games to understand how different political players exercise their authority and how policy outcomes emerge offers a rich research agenda.
APPENDIX I
The imputed values for the Court arising from the other legislative models are presented in Figures A1, A2 , and A3. 53 These charts illustrate the problems with the other three legislative models. Specifically, all three construct Pareto sets that reach beyond the feasible 0-100 scale, and as a consequence, tend to impose no palpable constraints on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the models tend to generate imputed ADA ratings that also violate 
APPENDIX II
Segal (1997) also employs the Segal-Cover (1989) scores as an alternative measurement for the Supreme Court's ideological preference. Our discussion above centers on the constitutional scores since the Segal-Cover scores have been shown to have important measurement errors (Epstein and Mershon 1996) . Nonetheless, we performed the same econometric analysis using the Segal-Cover scores to impute the Supreme Court's ideal point, and the results again show a strong influence of congressional preferences on Supreme Court decisions. We first report in Table A1 a four models show the political constraints coefficient to be highly significant. Similarly, the Court's ideology is also significant, though less so.
than the one whose ideology measure was derived from its constitutional decisions, further providing support to the strategic approach. Thus, independently of the measure used to estimate the ideological preferences of the Court, congressional preferences are shown to have a marked effect on Supreme Court's decisions.
APPENDIX III
A potent criticism of ADA scores, despite their widespread use, is that they conflate votes in both the House and Senate and in different Congresses across time. A more accurate measure of true ideologies, it is argued, would correct for this problem and allow for more accurate intertemporal and interchamber comparisons. In an extremely useful paper, Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) derive transformations that translate a certain ADA score for a given year in a given chamber into an "adjusted" ADA score that allow for such comparisons.
We perform additional estimations using the Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (GLS)
"adjusted" ADA scores and generated the results in Tables A3 and A4 . Similar to the results in Tables 1 and 2 above, these results illustrate the importance of the regime-switching methodology, as political constraints are significant in our maximum likelihood estimations but not in the linear models. In addition, the results exhibit the superiority of the F-V model and offer some support for the effectiveness of the CGK model. In general, the estimations with the adjusted ADA scores generate coefficients that are qualitatively similar to those produced from the "raw" ADA scores adding robustness to the estimation.
Conservative -------------A----------------------------B------S----------H--------C-----Liberal
Predicted Outcome: P a P s Figure 1 : Three justices, the House, and the Senate along an ideological spectrum with a continuum of policy outcomes. Attitudinal and Strategic models generate different predictions, P a and P s respectively.
Regime 2 Regime 3
Regime 1 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 Predicted SC~SC~ + 2*su SC~ -2*su High(PC) Low(PC) 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 Predicted SC~SC~ + 2*su SC~ -2*su High(MV) Low(MV) 1 In its applications to the external game faced by the justices, the strategic approach has been coined the "separation of powers" approach. See Eskridge (1991).
Conservative ---------|-----------{--------Congressional Pareto Set-----}--------|-----Liberal
2 Previous "strategic" approaches to judicial decision making can be found in Murphy's (1964) book on judicial strategy and in Dahl's (1957) suggestion that the selection process of Supreme Court justices caused judicial decisions to reflect the public's policy preferences since voters elected the judge-appointing politicians. See also Funston's (1975) analysis of the disagreements between the judicial and legislative branches during "changeover" periods of the Court. 3 The essence of strategic behavior is to consider the implications of one's behavior on rivals' optimal behavior.
In the sequential games commonly used in this literature, strategic behavior can be defined as maximizing behavior (with regard to policy preferences) that is forward-looking, in the sense of anticipating the possible actions by other policy makers. Supreme Court justices, in acting strategically, anticipate the subsequent actions of the Court's other justices (as in "games within the Court"), and of the other branches of government (as in the "separation of power games"). 4 That is, they vote their preferences sincerely. For a theoretical analysis of sincere voting as a dominant strategy within the court, and in general within groups, see Spiller and Spitzer (1995) . 5 Spiller and Gely (1992) found that in labor-relations cases in 1949-1988, the Supreme Court was constrained by Congressional policy preferences and, holding constant Court composition, Court decisions became increasingly more liberal (conservative) as relevant Members of Congress became more liberal (conservative). 6 We also show that Segal's conclusions result, in part, from a misspecified econometric model that is biased against the finding of strategic behavior. 7 Spiller and Tiller (1993) offer a model where the Court provokes a congressional reversal as a way to improve upon its policy outcome. 8 The strategic approach assumes that the Court can actually forecast which decisions would prompt Congress to act. Uncertain -or unknown-preferences are easily implementable. See, for example, Spiller (1992) , or Schwartz, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1996) . 13 Although some place the conservative end of a one-dimensional policy spectrum on the right side and place the liberal end on the left side, we use a different convention here. In later sections we proxy legislative preferences by legislators' ADA ratings, which give higher values to liberal legislative records.
14 The Congressional Pareto set contains all possible policies for which a movement away from a policy in that set would make either the House or the Senate worse off. In other words, it consists of the entire set of policies that Congress would not be able to overturn. Conversely, all policies outside the Pareto set would be overturned by Congress and replaced with some other policy within the set. 15 Segal's data set does not include individual decisions but rather the percent of decisions each year that were pro-liberal. Thus, we cannot correct for individual case characteristics, and there is a need to translate individual ideologies into a tendency to cast pro-liberal votes in Supreme Court cases. The assumption made in the text is intended to perform such a translation. 16 This could be alternatively characterized, as we do in the econometric model by averaging across a year, as a preference for 60% of the Supreme Court's decisions to produce a pro-liberal outcome. 17 Recall from the above section that the strategic model suggests that the Court's outcomes, in equilibrium, depend on a single political player, even if the relevant player is different across varying regimes. Our model begins its analysis with the preferences of that decisive player. Note that the model operates within the "probability" space, not the actual liberal/conservative nature of the Court's decision. Thus, the Court is seen as picking probabilities. In other words, although the Court picks for each case a pro liberal or pro-conservative outcome, its preferences, and those of the other players, are characterized by averages. Consequently, the equilibrium probability is independent of actual policies, which would not be the case if preferences were characterized by each individual policy outcome.
18 By this, we assume both that the identity of the critical player, a, remains constant throughout a given year and that her preferences remain constant through that year. Of course, there have been mid-year changes to both the membership of the Court and the membership of Congress (thus the difference between year t and period k).
contain some predicted scores (for individual justices in particular years) that rise above 100 and some that dip below 0. This is especially problematic since the 0-100 spectrum is supposed to cover all possible ideologies, and it calls into question the appropriateness of his method for calculating justices' ideologies. This error does not affect our results, however, since we use only the median justice's score, which is always within 0-100. 25 Because members of Congress vote on these issues, they are by nature non-constitutional. 26 See . 27 One could consider that Segal's conflation of ADA and Supreme Court constitutional scores within the same dimension is the flip side of his similar mistake in conflating ideological scores with policy outcomes. Segal directly compares ADA scores, Supreme Court constitutional scores, and policy outcomes to each other. In fact, a transformation is required to relate each one to the others. 28 Consider the following nonlinear transformation: call Segal's scores S, and let S' be a one-to-one nonlinear transformation of S that also spans (0, 100). It is possible to find a transformation where for the interval (0, 50), S' < S and for the range (50, 100) , S' > S. This transformation has the effect of making most S' closer to its extreme values. As a consequence, holding the congressional preferences constant, the values arising from S' will tend to be closer to the boundaries of the congressional Pareto set than the values arising from S. As we discuss below in detail, different transformations have very different implications for whether the strategic model is an appropriate representation of judicial decision making. Hence the choice of transformation is crucial, and there is no reason why transformation is the appropriate one. 29 The transformation allows a direct comparison between the judicial ideological values and the ADA legislative scores. Furthermore, our approach avoids the problem of relying on a given value to reflect an essentially unobservable judicial ideology, as our model instead offers a probability distribution of ideal points for the Supreme Court along an ADA scale. See Spiller and Gely (1992) for a fuller discussion of constructing this latent variable. 30 Given that the ADA ratings are constrained within the [0,100] range, the normality assumption of u may not be appropriate. An alternative transformation of the left hand side variable could be designed, but it will not allow for a straightforward test of Segal's assumption of similarity between the two levels. 31 See Spiller and Gely (1992) . 32 To see the bias formally, substitute, in the case of Regime 1 (SC>Max), equation (10) However, the second variable, SC i , which measures a justice's sincere preferences, is also in the regression equation and should not affect PL because the sample is selected so that SC exceeds Max. Since in the equationand this is by construction directly from (10) -Max and SC i share the same coefficient p, the regression would estimate a single value for the coefficient shared by the two variables even though they should generate coefficients of different values. The estimated parameter p, then, is an average between zero and the value of the coefficient that would be generated (in the case of a justice in Regime 1) if PL were regressed only on the explanatory variable Max. Consequently, the regression biases the estimated parameter p towards zero. A similar analysis shows that the same bias towards zero exists for Regime 2. 33 The median voter theorem is indeterminate in terms of how each player votes. The theorem only specifies that the median voter policy is the only equilibrium to the game, thus a majority must support it. But whether the outcome will be supported unanimously or by a large or thin majority is unspecified. Thus, we can only infer behavior by the median justice, who indeed must support the court's decision. 34 Segal observes that, according to his legislative models, very few justices appear to be constrained from 1947-1992. We find it unlikely that Congress and the individual justices share such ideological agreement -i.e. that so few justices would have policy preferences with which Congress would disagree. Segal's observation identifies some serious shortcomings to his legislative models. 35 The Multiple Veto model, for example, produces Pareto sets that both have a lower boundary below zero and an upper boundary above 100 for 32 of the 46 years studied. If this model accurately depicted congressional behavior, Congress would not have been able to overturn any Supreme Court decision, no matter how radical, for nearly 2/3 of all post-WWII years. But one could say something even more striking: since these are essentially legislative models, they say that Congress would not be able to legislate at all (at least over judiciary matters) during 2/3 of all post-WWII years, as any status quo would, in those years, always fall in the "gridlock" area. Such a prospect seems not only unlikely but is factually wrong. The Party Caucus model is only slightly better at offering feasible Pareto sets but still leads to impossible Pareto sets for 27 of the 46 years. The
